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ABSTRACT
We investigate theoretically and experimentally the crisis bargaining model, a
dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from
a commonly known distribution. Little work has been done to analyze whether and
how players update their beliefs in such games. Within the experiment we elicited
beliefs from players about their opponent’s type using a proper scoring rule. We
implement two treatments that vary the cost of backing down to the ﬁrst mover
after initial entry, generating sharp comparative static predictions in both beliefs
and strategies. We ﬁnd that players do update their beliefs in the predicted direc-
tions after observing some of the action choices. However, we highlight evidence
of conservative updating relative to rational expectations.
∗ We gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from Princeton’s Research Program in Political Econ-
omy. We thank Scott Ashworth, Roland Benabou, Raymond Hicks, Jens Grosser, Stephen Morris,
Kristopher Ramsay, Adam Meirowitz and Thomas Palfrey for helpful discussions. Paper previ-
ously presented at the CESS-NYU 2008 Experimental Political Science Conference, the Princeton
Lunchtime Political Methodology Meeting, and the 2007 Economic Science Association Annual
Meeting, Tuscon, Arizona.
Online Appendices available from:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010012_app
Supplementary Material available from:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010012_supp
MS submitted 23 February 2010; ﬁnal version received 22 September 2010
ISSN 1554-0626; DOI 10.1561/100.00010012
© 2010 D. H. Tingley and S. W. Wang
244 Tingley and Wang
INTRODUCTION
We study experimentally a strategic model of conﬂict, the crisis bargaining model, widely
used in the international relations literature (Fearon, 1994; Lewis and Schultz, 2003;
Schultz, 2001; Esarey et al., 2008) but also related to works on sequential games of two-
sided incomplete information in economics and other literatures (Kreps and Wilson,
1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Wilson, 1992; Carrillo and Palfrey, 2009; Fuden-
berg and Tirole, 1991, Chapter 9) that study the role of signalling. Although theoretical
predictions about this game using solution concepts such as the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium (PBE) are well known, less is known about actual strategic behavior and beliefs
in such dynamic games of two-sided incomplete information. Our focus is on the beliefs
that both agents hold about the other agent’s private information and how these beliefs
are updated. Such beliefs are at the foundation of strategic interactions with private
information but it is difﬁcult to observe beliefs directly with ﬁeld data (Manski, 2004)
and here we take an experimental approach.
In our experimental setting, we elicit beliefs about the opponent’s private information
at each decision node during game play using a strictly proper quadratic scoring rule.
We vary the payoff to one of the players at a potential terminal node as our treatment
variable. This payoff represents a cost to one player for initiating bargaining but then
backing down. Belief updating should be related to the magnitude of the cost. The high
versus low cost variation to the ﬁrst player generates sharp differences in PBE behavior
and beliefs. Our framework allows us to (1) test comparative statics of belief updating at
each decision node depending on whether the cost for backing down is high or low and
(2) characterize speciﬁc departures from equilibrium beliefs. Although the direction of
belief updating usually conforms to theory, we ﬁnd evidences of conservatism in beliefs
rather than rational expectations.
We survey the existing literature on experimental sequential games, beliefs and expec-
tations, and applications in economics and political science in the section Experimental
Studies of Updating. Next, in the section Model and Hypotheses, we describe the game
we study and solve for the perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We derive the equilibrium
cutpoints and expectations for both treatments and propose several hypotheses based
on the comparative statics. We then present the experimental design and procedures in
the section so named. The Results section follows. We test theoretical predictions about
belief updating and highlight conservative updating relative to rational expectations. We
conclude with an overview of our ﬁndings and suggestions for future work in the section
Conclusion.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF UPDATING
There has been a wealth of theoretical work on sequential games with one-sided and two-
sided incomplete information. While a corresponding experimental literature exists on
sequential games with one-sided incomplete information (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988;
Brandts and Holt, 1992; Banks et al., 1994; Jung et al., 1994; Cooper et al., 1997; Cai
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and Wang, 2006; Tingley and Walter, 2011; Drouvelis et al., 2009), far fewer experi-
mental studies focus on two- or multi-sided incomplete information sequential games
(McKelvey and Page, 2000; Carrillo and Palfrey, 2009; Dominitz and Hung, 2009). Fur-
thermore, few studies directly investigate the role of beliefs through belief elicitation
even though belief formation and updating ﬁgure prominently in sequential equilibrium
concepts.
Most elicited beliefs in experimental studies can be categorized into three types: prob-
abilistic beliefs about opponents’ actions in matrix games (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002;
Costa-Gomes and Weiszäcker, 2008), probabilistic beliefs about the state of the world
(McKelvey and Page, 1990; Dominitz and Hung, 2009), and beliefs about other play-
ers’ actions where the action space is continuous. Examples of the third type include
contributions in public goods games (Offerman et al., 1996; Croson, 2000) and invest-
ment in trust games (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000). Beliefs about the other player’s
private information, his type in this case, are not elicited as often (Dominitz and Hung,
2009). Furthermore, beliefs are usually elicited simultaneously from the players even in
sequential games (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) so
that the response of beliefs to observed actions cannot be ascertained.
We ﬁll these gaps in the literature by eliciting the expectation each player holds
about the other player’s private value after observing the other player’s action at the
previous decision node. Our elicitation mechanism is an easily understood incentive
compatible analog (Savage, 1971) of the quadratic scoring rule for probabilistic forecasts:
the deduction from a ﬁxed payoff is the squared distance between the expectation and
the realized value of the variable. By eliciting beliefs about the opponent’s private value
rather than chosen action, we can test equilibrium predictions for beliefs that previous
studies have not been able to address.
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Our game follows from the crisis bargaining literature (Lewis and Schultz, 2003; Esarey
et al., 2008). There are two players, 1 and 2. The sequence of moves of this game, with
generic payoff notation (left ﬁgure) and with the speciﬁc numerical payoffs for each
treatment provided to subjects, is depicted in Figure 1.
First, nature draws each player’s type, µi , independently from the same continuous
logistic distribution with PDF g(x) = ex(1+ex)2 . The distribution from which the types are
drawn is a common knowledge while the actual types of the respective players are private
information. Player 1, the potential entrant, then chooses whether or not to Enter (E or
not E) and challenge player 2. If 1 chooses not to Enter, the status quo prevails and the
players receive S1,S2 = 0. If 1 does Enter, then 2 decides whether or not to Resist 1’s
challenge (R or Not R). If 2 does not Resist, the game ends with 2 conceding to 1 and the
players receive D1 = 0.5 and B2 = −0.3. If player 2 Resists, then 1 must decide whether
or not to Fight (F or Not F). If 1 chooses not to Fight, then the game ends and the
players receive B1 < 0 and D2 = 0.5. We vary the ﬁxed value of B1 to a high cost (−0.3)
and low cost (−0.1) level to generate crisp comparative static predictions that we detail
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Figure 1.
below. If 1 decides to Fight then the game ends and the players receive a ﬁxed payoff,
W1,W2 = 0.5, plus their respective private values µ1,µ2. The equilibrium strategies
are characterized by equilibrium cutpoints which players 1 and 2 use to decide between
the binary choices at each of the decision nodes. Given the cutpoints, we can also ﬁnd
the equilibrium belief that each player has about the other player’s type after observing
each possible action.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Hypotheses
We solve for the perfect Bayesian Equilibria using the standard backward induction
method and assuming risk neutrality of the players. A summary of results is presented
in Table 1 and a complete derivation is presented in the supplementary material. Here
we sketch out the intuition behind the equilibrium strategies which differ as a function
of B1, the cost to Player 1 of choosing to Not Fight and our treatment variable in the
experiment.
If the cost of choosing Not Fight is low enough, as in our low cost treatment, then
there is an unique equilibrium in which Player 1s choose Enter regardless of their private
value. In this case, the potential gains from having Player 2 choosing Not Resist are
sufﬁciently high compared to the small cost of backing down that all Player 1s pool on
Enter. Suppose all Player 1s choose to Enter. The probability of a Player 1 choosing
Fight given Enter is substantially less than 1 because all players who chose Enter but
have a private value below the cutpoint for Fight (µ1 = −0.80) will choose Not Fight.
Player 2s, knowing that some portion of Player 1s will ultimately choose to Not Fight,
have a low cutpoint (µ2 = −1.23) and hence are more likely to choose Resist. In this low
cost condition, the probability of choosing Resist given Enter is high since the probability
of facing Fight is low. Nevertheless, when the cost of choosing Not Fight is sufﬁciently
low (e.g. B1 = −0.1), the expected gain outweighs the expected loss and Enter is always
preferred to Not Enter at the ﬁrst node.
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On the other hand, if the cost of choosing Not Fight is high enough, as in our high cost
treatment (B1 = −0.3), then there is an unique equilibrium in which Player 1s below a
cutpoint (µ1 = −0.72) choose Not Enter and Player 1s who choose Enter in equilibrium
also always choose Fight at the last node. In contrast with the low cost treatment, there is
separation at the Entry stage in the high cost condition. The Player 1s with sufﬁciently
low private values will not choose Enter because if the last node is reached, the loss there
is a sufﬁciently high deterrent. Suppose that the probability of Fight given Enter is 1.
Then the probability of Resist given Enter is low because of the maximal probability of
facing Fight. The cutpoint for Player 2s to choose Resist is, in this case, higher than in
the low cost condition (µ2 = −0.8) because fewer will want to face a Fight choice. Still,
the potential loss from Player 2 choosing Resist and then having to choose Not Fight is
high enough that Not Enter is always preferred to Enter then Not Fight when the cost
of choosing Not Fight is high enough (e.g. B1 = −0.3). Thus, if Player 1 chooses Enter,
Fight must be chosen at the ﬁnal node in the unique equilibrium.1
For both the Low Cost and High Cost treatments, we report in Table 1 the
expectations one player should have (Ei) about the other player’s private value after
Table 1. Equilibrium predictions.
Backdown payoff
Low cost: B1 = −0.1 High cost: B1 = −0.3
Cutpoints
µE1 ∀µ1 −0.72
µR2 −1.23 −0.80
µF1 −0.60 −0.80
Beliefs
E2: Enter 0 0.94
E2: Not Enter N/A −1.93
E1: Resist 0.69 0.9
E1: Not Resist −2.36 −2
E1: N/A 0 0
1 In the supplementary material we show that there exists a threshold BH1 such that for all B1 > B
H
1
Player 1 always chooses to Enter in the unique PBE. The B1 we chose for our low cost treatment,
−0.1, is higher than BH1 . We also show there exists a threshold BL1 such that for all B1 < BL1 , Player
1 always choose Fight given Entry in the unique PBE. The B1 we chose for our high cost treatment,
−0.3, is lower than BL1 . For intermediate values of B1, Player 1 could be made indifferent between
Not Entering versus Entering and Not Fighting given a certain probability of Resist. In this case,
for the private values under which Player 1 would not choose Enter and Fight, we can partition
them any way we want for the Not Enter region and the Enter and Not Fight region due to the
indifference. The supplementary material also contains the solution to an Agent-Quantal Response
Equilibrium (AQRE) model. The direction of the comparative statics for the AQRE is similar to
that of the PBE though we note several important differences.
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every possible action along with the cutpoints (µF1 , µ
R
2 , and µ
E
1 ) at each decision node
for both cost treatments. The cutpoints give us the truncated distribution from which
the players form their equilibrium beliefs about the expectation of the other player’s
value. Calculations for all cutpoints and expectations in both treatments can be found in
the supplementary material.
We focus on two testable comparative statics for the low versus high cost treatment
from the equilibrium beliefs. We focus on the beliefs instead of action proﬁles, though
in equilibrium they are related. The supplementary material contains relevant tests of
whether action choices conform to the PBE predictions.
Hypothesis B1: after Player 1 has chosen E, Player 2’s belief about Player 1’s private
value should be higher when B1 = −0.3 than when B1 = −0.1.
Hypothesis B2: the expectation of Player 2’s private value that we elicit from Player 1
after Player 2 has chosen either R or not R should be higher when B1 = −0.3 than when
B1 = −0.1.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
We conducted 12 sessions with a total of 96 subjects from spring 2007 to spring 2008.
The subjects were registered undergraduate students at a university who were recruited
by e-mail solicitation. Sessions were conducted in a computer lab and all interactions
were computerized and anonymous. No subject participated in more than one session.
The cost to Player 1 of choosing Not Fight was ﬁxed within an experimental session.
After entering the laboratory, subjects were seated at workstations with dividers and
were given several instructional worksheets to read over. A set of instructions was also
presented verbally with projected slides. Subjects were informed of the structure of the
game (strategies and payoffs), re-matching procedure, and a thorough description of the
properties of the distribution from which private values were drawn. During this period
subjects were guided through an example series of interactions using their computers,
and then were asked to answer a series of comprehension questions. They could not
proceed unless all the answers were correct.
In the experiment, two subjects were paired together and randomly assigned both
a position (position 1 or position 2) and a private value was drawn from a standard
logistic distribution.After receiving these assignments subjectswould then play the game
once before being paired with someone else. In each pair Player 2s would report their
belief about Player 1’s type following Player 1’s choice of “E” or “not E” and Player 1s
would report their belief following either Player 2’s choice or if “not E” was chosen. To
incentivize this belief elicitation we utilized the incentive compatible quadratic scoring
rule (Savage, 1971) of the form S = α − β(E − X)2, where E is the elicited expectation
of the other player’s private value and X is the other player’s actual private value. In all
experimental sessions, we set α = 0.5 and β = 0.1.2 While the realized payoffs from
2 Incentivized belief elicitation can generate various problems. Hedging (Blanco et al., 2011) is less
of a concern here because we are eliciting beliefs about the opponent’s private value rather than
action. Incentivization might create additional incentives for making particular strategy choices,
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beliefs are lower than the realized payoffs from game play on average, we believe that
the payoff for accuracy and the substantial punishment for inaccuracy were sufﬁcient
incentives for forming and updating to accurate beliefs. We present further evidence in
the results section that subjects were incentivized to state sensible beliefs.3
Subjects were re-paired after each round and received randomly assigned private
values and positions. When all subjects had been paired with all other subjects once, we
repeated the experiment with randomly matched subjects again. We repeated the exper-
iment nine times. We randomly selected one repetition of the experiment with which to
pay subjects, and reminded subjects of this procedure so as to maintain their focus.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents several summary statistics. The gender ratio is close to 50/50 in the
low cost treatment and a slightly larger majority of subjects are female in the high cost
treatment. Because we found relatively little gender difference, we are not concerned
about this imbalance.4 In addition to a show-up fee of $10, subjects in the high and low
cost treatment earned on average $7 with a maximum of $17.5
Belief Accuracy and Best Response
We ﬁrst present evidence that subjects are stating sensible beliefs before going on to
analyze the elicited beliefs inmore detail. Subjects’ beliefs are signiﬁcantlymore accurate
Table 2. Summary statistics by treatment condition.
Private value Belief Game payoff Belief payoff %Female N
Treatment Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
High cost 0.02 1.82 0.11 1.49 0.66 1.14 0.15 1.12 65% 3024
Low Cost −0.01 1.84 0.15 1.21 0.68 1.23 0.16 0.72 56% 2968
such as an additional (unmodelled) incentive to enter in order to ﬁnd out information about their
opponent. This is a valid concern and one that we had to trade off against our desire to elicit
beliefs and strategies from the same individual. In practice, the total difference in belief payoffs
between entrants deciding not to enter and those entering was small enough to not systematically
change the comparative static predictions. Alternative designs such as using observers who only
make predictions about private values would ensure greater focus on belief formation and updating
(Offerman et al., 1996; Palfrey and Wang, 2009).
3 At the bottom of the screen all subjects were provided with a history table of the current period’s
decisions, point earnings from strategy choices, and reported belief about the other subject’s private
value. Point earnings from beliefs were not reported until completing all interactions with that
subject.
4 Results available from author.
5 A computer malfunction caused us to lose the ﬁrst round of data from our ﬁnal experimental session
in the low cost treatment, and hence the sample sizes are slightly different.
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than beliefs randomly drawn from the logit distribution. To measure this difference we
took each observation and calculated the difference between what was earned based on
the subject’s stated belief and what they would have earned if they had stated a randomly
drawn belief taken from a logit distribution. In the low cost treatment this difference was
on average 0.34(0.26, 0.41) (standard errors clustered at subject level and 95%conﬁdence
intervals in parentheses) and 0.3(0.15, 0.43) for the high cost treatment. Given that a
subject could earn at most 0.5 points for a belief that guessed exactly the other player’s
private value, this is a substantial improvement.6
Testing the Belief Hypotheses
We ﬁnd support for Hypothesis B1 which states that following an Enter choice Player 2’s
expectation of Player 1’s private value should be higher when the cost of backing down
is higher. Player 2’s belief does get updated to a higher level after observing Entry in the
high cost case (0.77) compared with the low cost case (0.58). A difference in means test
with standard errors clustered by individual, which we use below as well, shows these
beliefs are signiﬁcantly different from each other (p < 0.05, one-tailed tests used for
directional hypotheses). Player 2s appear to understand that Player 1s who Enter in the
high cost treatment have, on average, higher private values than Player 1s who enter in
the low cost treatment because the cost of choosing to Not Fight down the line is higher.7
Substantively, this means that decision-makers who are challenged in a conﬂict adjust
their beliefs conditional on the incentives of their opponent further down the game tree.
If, for example, backing down is relatively cheap for player 1 at the ﬁnal node, then the
amount of updating will be more moderate. Higher costs, such as those hypothesized in
the audience cost literature in international relations, will lead to more updating (e.g.,
Tomz, 2007).
We do ﬁnd substantial separation in Player 1 beliefs after observing a Resist choice
versus Not Resist in both the low and high cost treatments. As with the Entry choice,
subjects were on average updating in the predicted direction. However, our results do
not support Hypothesis B2 at conventional signiﬁcance levels. Hypothesis B2 predicted
that when faced with resistance, Player 1s would update to larger values in the high cost
treatment compared to the low cost treatment. Conversely, when facedwith no resistance,
6 Player 2’s expectation of Player 1’s type also allows a rough test of whether action choices are optimal
given stated beliefs. Under the assumption that Player 1 behaves according to the PBE, Player 2’s
belief about Player 1’s private value also implies a belief about the probability of Fight. Using this
probability, we calculate that 91% and 95% of Player 2 decisions were best responses in the low
and high cost case, respectively. Actual Player 1 decisions reveal similar high levels of best response
rates (97% in the high cost treatment and 95% in the low cost treatment). These high rates of best
response indicate that beliefs are mostly consistent with rather than orthogonal to action choices,
thoughwe acknowledge that the best response function is constant for wide ranges of beliefs/private
values.
7 The PBE prediction for the low cost case is that there should be no updating following Entry. The
supplementary material shows how in the AQRE players will update some in a positive direction.
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player 1s should update to less extreme negative values in the high cost case.8 Following
the decision of Player 2 to Resist, Player 1s’ reported beliefs of Player 2’s private value
were on average 0.55 in the low cost treatment and 0.64 in the high cost treatment, a
difference in the correct direction but insigniﬁcant (p = 0.23). For beliefs following a
Not Resist choice, the averages were −1.18 for the low cost treatment and −1.36 for
the high cost treatment, which is in the opposite direction predicted by hypothesis 2
but still insigniﬁcant (p = 0.12). The lack of signiﬁcant difference in Player 1 beliefs
across treatments suggests that the indirect impact of the Not Fight cost on Player 2’s
action choice is not as obvious as its direct impact on Player 1’s decision to Enter or Not
Enter. This suggests that Player 1s might not properly take into account how the cost
of choosing Not Fight impacts both their Entry decisions but also Player 2s subsequent
Resistance decisions. In the game that we investigate, Player 1’s beliefs about Player 2’s
private value does not directly impact his/her decision about Fight or Not Fight as
his/her payoff in these nodes depends only on his/her private value. While our design
allows us to observe belief updating by both the players, empirically this updating is most
consistent with theory when the beliefs are consequential for choice. Crisis bargaining
models in the literature typically assume that updating will happen when it can happen.
However, there are related games in which the payoff does depend on the other player’s
private value (e.g., a bonus to the player with the higher private value only). Whether
Player 1’s lack of differentiated beliefs across cost treatments about Player 2’s private
value is due to this lack of strategic necessity is an open question.
Overall, we ﬁnd some support for comparative static predictions over beliefs derived
from our PBE model. Our subjects updated beliefs following entry choices conditional
on the incentives they and their opponents faced. This provides some behavioral support
for the beliefs conjectured to exist in PBE. Next we turn to instances where our subjects
departed from our equilibrium predictions.
Testing Rational Expectations
Do the subjects have rational expectations about their opponents? By rational expecta-
tions, we mean that the players’ expectations about their opponents’ private values are
correct on average. A ﬁrst pass is to simply compare average beliefs and average private
values following a particular action choice. We present these values and their standard
errors in Table 3. Here we see, for example, that beliefs about private values following a
No Entry choice were less negative than the average of actual private values of subjects
choosing Not Enter. A similar pattern is seen for Resist and Not Resist, though not for
Entry as we discuss below.
8 Intuitively, in the low cost case Player 2s should believe that somePlayer 1swill ultimately back down
if faced with resistance. This induces Player 2s with lower private values in the low cost treatment
to resist. Conversely, when entry is chosen in the high cost case Player 2s expect that Player 1 is
unlikely to back down (see audience cost discussion above). Hence beliefs following resistance and
no resistance should be higher in the high cost case.
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Table 3. Average private value of opponent versus average belief
(standard errors clustered at subject level in parentheses).
High cost Low cost
Choice Value Belief Value Belief
Entry 0.75(0.05) 0.77(0.09) 0.45(0.06) 0.58(0.06)
No Entry −1.87(0.07) −1.44(0.10) −1.80(0.06) −1.16(0.14)
Resist 0.86(0.06) 0.64(0.10) 0.72(0.06) 0.55(0.05)
No Resist −1.88(0.05) −1.36(0.09) −1.93(0.07) −1.19(0.12)
Next we examine conservative updating in more detail by comparing our subjects’
beliefs after observing each strategy choice to the actual private values of subjects who
made the corresponding strategy choice.9 In most cases, beliefs are signiﬁcantly closer to
the 0 prior than the actual private values for both cost treatments. We ﬁrst compare the
stated beliefs after observing no Entry to the private values of their opponents who chose
Not Enter. We ﬁnd that the stated beliefs are signiﬁcantly less negative than the actual
private values and thus closer to the zero prior in both treatments (low cost: p < 0.001;
high cost p < 0.001). Similarly, after observing no Resistance, Player 1s update to stated
beliefs that are less negative (closer to the zero prior) than the private values of the players
who chose to Not Resist in both the low cost (p < 0.001) and high cost (p < 0.001)
treatments. After observing Resistance, Player 1s update to stated beliefs that are less
positive (closer to the zero prior) than the private values of Player 2s who chose Resist
in both the low cost (p < 0.05) and high cost (p < 0.1) cases. In all three of these
instances we observe conservatism in updating.10 In contrast, after observing Entry in
both cost treatments, Player 2s actually update to stated beliefs that are higher than
9 That is, we take the difference between the belief and private value of the opponent and see whether
this difference is signiﬁcantly different from 0. We cluster standard errors at the subject-level and
report p-values corresponding to a two-tail test.
10 The supplementary material derives expected beliefs under the Agent Quantal Response Equilib-
rium (AQRE) model using the maximum likelihood estimate of the precision parameter λ. While
these beliefs are closer to the observed beliefs, they still do not account for this ﬁnding. Furthermore,
AQRE is still a rational expectations model and so it cannot in principle explain the conservatism we
observe. It is possible that subject misunderstanding of the distribution of private values generates
this behavior. We highlight some reasons why these results are unlikely. First, in the Not Resist case,
the conservative updating result is largely driven by Player 1s stating a belief of 0 for the expected
private value of Player 2. Following a Not Resist choice, 33% and 34% of beliefs were 0 in the high
and low cost case and in both cases this was the highest percentage of beliefs. Since it is unlikely
that subjects did not understand the symmetry of the distribution or that it was centered at 0 as this
was stressed in the instructions, no misunderstanding about the variance of the distribution could
have led to these 0 beliefs. Second, subject misunderstanding of the variance of the private value
distribution — here that the variance was smaller than it was in reality — could have led to the
conservatism in updating that we observe. The average values of Player 1s who chose Not Enter are
−1.87 and −1.80 in the high and low cost treatments, respectively, which roughly corresponds to
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(further away from the zero prior) the average private value of the Player 1s who chose
to Enter. However, the difference is small in magnitude and only marginally signiﬁcant
in the low cost case (low cost: p = 0.07; high cost: p = 0.79).11
Conservatism in beliefs (Edwards, 1968) has been documented for stated probabilistic
beliefs about action choicesmade in the experimental population (Huck andWeizsäecker,
2002). Here we provide the ﬁrst systematic account of conservatism in beliefs about
opponent type after observing the opponent’s action in a sequential game of two-sided
incomplete information (similarly, see Dominitz and Hung, 2009). A number of recent
models such as cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) and behavioral equilibrium
(Esponda, 2008) are built upon the observation that agents do not properly account for
the connection between other agents’ private information and action choice in bilateral
trade with adverse selection, auctions, voting games, etc. The conservatism in belief
updatingwe ﬁnd offers evidence of this disconnect.More speciﬁcally, our subjects under-
estimate what some actions reveal about private values more than other actions. After
their opponent chooses to Not Enter or Not Resist, they fail to expect the extent to
which such a choice indicates a low private value/strength. Such “inertia” in updating
can have considerable implications for optimal strategies in a broad class of games with
private information. For instance, a number of experiments on signaling games have
documented behavior that is consistent with sluggish updating about the opponent’s
type within or across trials (Cooper et al., 1997; Potters and van Winden, 1996; Kübler
et al., 2008). Kübler et al.’s study of a Spence education game ﬁnd that the wage spread
is not as large as predicted by the equilibrium, suggesting that the wage-setters might
not be updating as much as they should about the workers’ types based on their signals.
They suggest that “for future research it could be useful to elicit the beliefs of players
in order to pin down the equilibrium more precisely” (p. 234). Indeed, our results about
conservative updating in a related setting offer suggestive evidence that the wage setting
could have been driven by conservative updating about the workers’ types.12 More work
can be done in the future to elicit beliefs in various games of incomplete information
to examine if belief updating patterns within or across trials can account for particular
deviations from equilibrium behavior.13
cutpoint at −0.6. Suppose that Player 2s believe the cutoff value to be −0.6 but misunderstood the
variance of the logistical distribution. Numerical calculations for this example and others suggest
that the perceived variance would need to be substantially smaller in order to generate the observed
average beliefs.
11 We suggest one possible account of the discrepancy between the lack of conservative updating by
Player 2s following Entry and the strong conservative updating results after no Entry. There are
a number of Player 1s with negative private values who choose to Enter, thus pulling the average
private value down following entrywhile also leaving subjectswithmore negative values not entering.
12 Whether this underestimation can be exploited or serve as a deterrent is the topic of future work. It
is also possible that having subjects work together could reduce the amount of conservatism (Cooper
and Kagel, 2005).
13 The supplementary material shows that players’ action choices are mostly in line with the PBE
predictions but there are deviations such as some no-Entry in the low cost treatment and Not Fight
choices in the high cost treatment.
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CONCLUSION
Our study is one of the ﬁrst to examine beliefs and strategies in a sequential game
with two-sided incomplete information, speciﬁcally the crisis bargaining game, in the
laboratory. This class of games has relevant applications in industrial organization, inter-
national relations, and legal studies, among other ﬁelds. We directly elicit the expectation
each player holds about his/her opponent’s type at various decision nodes rather than
his/her expectation about his/her opponent’s strategy choice, as in most previous belief
elicitation studies. We ﬁnd some evidence that players update their beliefs in directions
consistent with the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, players update conserva-
tively compared to the average private values of subjects for most strategy choices. That
is, the beliefs remain sticky around the prior and violate rational expectations.
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